Third Circuit Says Language Barrier Does Not Make Contract Unenforceable
Max Kennerly at Litigation & Trial wrote earlier this week about a recent decision from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals that held that an arbitration provision in an employment agreement can be enforced even though the agreement was written in English, which the employee did not speak. Law.com also had this article about the decision.
In Morales v. Sun Constructors, Inc., 2008 WL 3974059 (3rd Cir. August 28, 2008), the court was asked to determine “whether an arbitration clause in an employment agreement is enforceable where one party is ignorant of the language in which the agreement is written.”
The court concluded that, in the absence of fraud, “the fact that an offeree cannot read, write, speak, or understand the English language is immaterial to whether an English-language agreement the offeree executes is enforceable.” The 2-1 decision reversed the district court, which had found that mutual assent to the agreement did not exist as a result of the language barrier.
But the majority opinion written by Judge Michael A. Chagares failed to address that when Sun required Morales and other hourly employees to attend an orientation session conducted in English and to sign the employment agreement, Sun asked another employee, Hodge, who was bilingual and whom Morales knew, to explain what was happening in the orientation and to help Morales understand the agreement. And Hodge testified that he generally understands about eighty-five percent of what is said and written in English, and that he did not specifically explain the arbitration provision to Morales.
Basically, once Morales signed the agreement, regardless of what he did or didn’t understand or knew or didn’t know about its provisions, he was bound by the agreement, including its mandatory arbitration clause.
The dissent written by Judge Julio M. Fuentes identifies the real issue in the case: “The gravamen of this case is that Sun – the other party the Agreement – took upon itself the task of translating the Agreement for Morales and, in doing so, failed to convey the entire contents of the Agreement. What we must determine is whether this failure resulted in a lack of mutual assent; I believe that it did.”
I think this paragraph in the dissent summarizes the case:
If the facts of this case were different, I might adopt the majority’s position. For example, if Sun had simply handed the Agreement to Morales and indicated that it was Morales’ responsibility to find a translator, and Morales had employed an incompetent translator who failed to translate the arbitration clause, I would agree that Morales was bound by the Agreement. However, when Sun made the decision to insert itself between Morales and the contract, it created a situation where lack of mutual assent could, and did, occur. Because I do not believe it was negligent or otherwise improper for Morales to rely upon the translation provided by Sun, and because Morales was not informed in the course of that translation that the Agreement contained an arbitration clause, I agree with the District Court that Morales “did not manifest an intention” to be bound by the arbitration clause.
Mike Garrison's "resignation" today as president of West Virginia University