Arbitrator, Not Court, Has Exclusive Authority to Resolve Disputes under Arbitration Agreement

As promised (or maybe threatened), today I want to discuss one of the two new decisions from the United States Supreme Court dealing with arbitration. Although I had intended to address both, I think that Granite Rock Co. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, 2010 WL 2518518 (June 24, 2010), which deals with arbitration in a collective-bargaining agreement, deserves more attention than I'm prepared to give it at this point. 

And if you missed it, yesterday I wrote about two recent decisions from the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia that focus on the trial court's scope of review of an arbitration agreement.

While arbitration provisions have long been incorporated in, for instance, brokerage contracts and mobile phone contracts, the provisions are found increasingly in other documents, such as employment agreements. As the following decision makes clear, regardless of your area(s) of specialization and whether you represents plaintiffs or defendants, you need to know about arbitration.

In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 2010 WL 2471058 (June 21, 2010), the agreement to arbitrate was separate from the employment agreement and required the plaintiff, Jackson, to agree to its terms as a condition of employment. It also provided that the arbitrator, and not any court or agency, "shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of this Agreement, including, but not limited to any claim that all or any part of this Agreement is void or voidable."

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WV Supreme Court Limits Scope of Trial Court Review of Arbitration Agreement

I want to close out the month by discussing two decisions from the Supreme Court of Appeals that address the scope of the trial court's review of an arbitration agreement. Tomorrow I'll write about two new decisions from the United States Supreme Court that also deal with arbitration.

In State ex rel TD Ameritrade, Inc. v. Kaufman, 692 S.E.2d 293 (W. Va. 2010), TD Ameritrade claimed that Dan Salamie was required to arbitrate his claim that Ameritrade was vicariously liable for losses Salamie sustained when his broker, Bruce Conrad, disregarded his instructions regarding various investments.  Ameritrade moved to compel arbitration and to dismiss Salamie's lawsuit and/or to stay the litigation pending the outcome of arbitration.

Salamie did not oppose arbitration so long as Ameritrade stipulated that Conrad was within its "control," as defined by federal securities law, so that Salamie could establish that Ameritrade was vicariously liable for Conrad's actions. Ameritrade refused the stipulation, so Salamie responded to Ameritrade's motion to compel and moved for partial summary judgment on whether Conrad was a "controlled person."

The circuit court granted Ameritrade's motion to compel arbitration, but also granted Salamie's motion for partial summary judgment, and made findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding Conrad's status, and ordered the arbitrator to adopt those findings and conclusions. Ameritrade sought a writ of prohibition against the circuit court's ruling on the grounds that the court exceeded its authority by ruling on the merits of the dispute even though it had compelled arbitration.

Ameritrade argued that the circuit court was limited to deciding whether the underlying dispute was subject to arbitration and could not address the merits of the dispute. Unlike most cases involving arbitration, where the parties are fighting over whether arbitration is required or whether the Federal Arbitration Act is applicable, the parties' disagreement here was "whether the trial court had the authority to address any matters in addition to the threshold issue of arbitrability."

In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Thomas McHugh, the Court agreed with Ameritrade's position and rejected Salamie's reliance on the severability doctrine, which provides that a trial court can address a challenge to an arbitration clause, but that only an arbitrator can consider a challenge to the contract as a whole:

Seeking to forestall an arbitral ruling that the contracts executed between Mr. Salamie and TD Waterhouse were not binding on successor Ameritrade and also seeking to prevent the arbitrator from concluding that Mr. Conrad was not a "controlled person" under federal law, Mr. Salamie persuaded the trial court to rule on issues that involve the merits of the underlying dispute. This foray into matters reserved for arbitral resolution was clearly improper. When a trial court is required to rule upon a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2006), the authority of the trial court is limited to determining the  threshold issues of (1) whether a valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties; and (2) whether the claims averred by the plaintiff fall within the substantive scope of that arbitration agreement.

(Emphasis added).

The excerpt in bold represents new syllabus point part 2 of the opinion. 

Finally, the Court also found that the circuit court erred in ruling on Salamie's motion for partial summary judgment, as the ruling was improper under the severability doctrine, and also because "unresolved factual issues" combined with the lack of discovery made the ruling improper.

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WV Supreme Court Addresses Substance, Procedure of Arbitration in Two New Decisions

Today I want to bring to your attention two new decision from the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, which deal with the substance and procedure of the arbitration process.

In the first opinion, State ex rel. Clites v. Clawges, 2009 WL 3320488 (W.Va. 2009), Clites was hired as a customer service representative of TeleTech, and participated in a group employee orientation session that included the discussion and completion of employment-related paperwork. After nearly three years of employment, however, TeleTech terminated Clites. She filed suit and alleged that her termination was due to a sexual harassment complaint she had filed against TeleTech.

TeleTech moved to dismiss and/or stay Clites' lawsuit because she had signed an arbitration agreement that required her to arbitrate and to give up her right to a jury trial. The agreement provided that the arbitration would be conducted by an American Arbitration Association arbitrator in the city where the employee is employed, and that each party would bear its own fees and costs, except that the arbitrator would have discretion to award fees and costs to the prevailing party as provided by law.

The Circuit Court of Monongalia County, West Virginia denied the motion to dismiss and granted the motion to stay. The court found that the arbitration agreement was a contract of adhesion, but that TeleTech had stipulated through an affidavit that the arbitration would take place in Morgantown, West Virginia and that TeleTech would pay for all costs that would not be incurred by Clites in court, such as the cost of the arbitrator, the hearing room, and stenographer.

Clites sought a writ of prohibition against the court's order on the grounds that the arbitration agreement was a contract of adhesion with unconscionable terms and therefore was unenforceable. She asserted that a reference in the agreement to Denver, Colorado required the arbitration to take place there and that she was responsible for fees and costs in excess of what she would have to pay in a civil action.

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