Closing Arguments Begin in DuPont Class Action

    Closing arguments began yesterday in Harrison County Circuit Court in the trial of the class action against DuPont and other defendants, which seeks compensatory damages for medical monitoring and property damage claims, and punitive damages.  Here are articles on the trial from Business Week's website and the Associated Press.

    The closing arguments represent the conclusion of the first phase of the trial, which addresses the liability of the defendants.  If the jury determines that the defendants are liable, then the jury will determine whether to award damages for medical monitoring, and if so, how much.  In the third phase, the jury will determine whether to award property damages, and in the fourth phase, the jury will determine whether to award punitive damages. 

Weekend Update

    In the Saturday Gazette-Mail (Charleston, West Virginia), Tom Searls has a nice recap on Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital's appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals from a $6.5 million verdict in a medical malpractice trial.  I wrote yesterday that the Court rejected the petition by a vote of 3-2.

    Also in the paper is an article on Marshall University's decision to start disciplining students who are accused of downloading songs illegally.  Marshall's decision was apparently prompted by the lawsuits filed by some record companies against two students, which I wrote about earlier today.  Although 20 Marshall students received pre-litigation settlement letters from the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) in February, and nine more received them last month, Marshall had not previously taken any disciplinary action.  According to Stephen Hensley, the dean of student affairs, who is quoted in the article, the students' use of Marshall's network to download and/or distribute the songs violates the university's code of conduct and carries the risk of disciplinary action.

    Marshall needs to be careful in how it proceeds.  It has an interest in upholding its code of conduct and giving students a disincentive from engaging in similar conduct, but it cannot and should not rely solely on the RIAA's allegations against a student as the basis for any disciplinary action.  As noted in a 2005 post in the blog, Ars Technica,
But the RIAA has been wrong before, as it was in its 2003 suit against Sarah Seabury Ward, a sixty-something sculptor who was accused of downloading gangsta rap. The suit was eventually withdrawn, but the case (and others like it, including one against a dead grandmother) does shed some doubt on the RIAA's ability to correctly identify the infringing party.   With Santangelo's case now headed for trial, a judge's ruling may provide more clarity about what the RIAA can and cannot do in its war on musical piracy.
    There is also an equal protection issue.  It isn't clear from the Gazette-Mail article whether Marshall is going to discipline only the two students who have been sued or the nine who received the RIAA's pre-litigation settlement letters.  But if it's going to act against the nine who received the letters last month, what's it going to do about the 20 students who received the letters in February?   Dean Hensley's explanation that, "We were new at it then, and we're not so new at it now," isn't very reassuring. 

Recording Companies Sue Marshall Students for Copyright Infringement

    The Charleston (West Virginia) Gazette reported yesterday that record companies, including Sony BMG Music Entertainment and Warner Bros. Records, Inc., have filed lawsuits against two Marshall University students for copyright infringements based on the students’ alleged illegal file sharing. The plaintiffs allege that on January 18, 2007, Tristan Hicks downloaded and/or distributed 487 songs, and on January 19, 2007, Jonathan P. Shrewsberry downloaded and/or distributed 240 songs. 

    The plaintiffs seek an injunction against each defendant prohibiting any further infringement of copyrighted materials and requiring the destruction of all such recordings, statutory damages for each infringement of each copyrighted recording, and costs and attorney’s fees.  Here are the complaints against Shrewsberry and Hicks, which were filed on September 18.

    Apparently, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) sent pre-litigation settlement letters to Shrewsberry and Hicks.  According to the RIAA, those letters give “students the opportunity to resolve copyright infringement claims (www.p2plawsuits.com) against them at a discounted rate before a formal lawsuit is filed.  Each pre-litigation settlement letter informs the school of a forthcoming copyright infringement suit against one of its students or personnel and requests that university administrators forward the letter to the appropriate network user.”  

    The RIAA sent out 403 letters to 22 universities this week, and filed 24 copyright infringement lawsuits, including presumably those against Shrewsberry and Hicks.  As of March 2007, Marshall was on the RIAA’s list of the top 25 universities to receive copyright infringement complaints.

    I realize that what Shrewsberry and Hicks are alleged to have done violates the recording companies' copyrights, and I am not condoning their conduct.  But I have always felt that the RIAA lawsuits are a misguided effort to enforce its members' copyrights.  And I'm not alone.  Here's what the Electronic Frontier Foundation has to say about the RIAA's approach.

Court Refuses Hospital's Appeal from Malpractice Verdict

    As a follow up to yesterday's post, the Supreme Court of Appeals refused, by a vote of 3-2, Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital's petition for appeal from an adverse jury verdict of $4,834,380.00, which was rendered last year in a medical malpractice case. 

Hospital Seeks Review of Malpractice Verdict

    Yesterday on the Supreme Court of Appeals' motion docket, Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital presented its petition for appeal from a verdict in an action alleging wrongful death due to medical malpractice.  In March 2006, the Wood County jury returned a verdict of $6.5 million, which was subsequently reduced to $4,834,380.00 to reflect an offset from a settlement with another party.   Bernard Boggs, Administrator v. Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital Corp., Nos. 063408 and 070578. 

    In addition to the jury verdict's in the underlying action that was before the Court yesterday, this is the case that also resulted in an award of sanctions against the hospital and its counsel for more than $1.3 million a few months ago.

Discredited Surgeon Sues Hospital's Counsel

    I have written on several occasions about the medical malpractice cases that are pending against Dr. John King and Putnam General Hospital, where he was employed from November 2002 until June 2003.  In July, a jury found that Putnam General Hospital and its parent, HCA, are liable for negligently hiring and credentialing King to perform orthopedic surgery.  I also wrote about a video that was mysteriously posted on YouTube, which purported to contain clips from certain plaintiffs' depositions followed by clips from surveillance videos.

    Two days ago, In the Sunday Gazette-Mail (Charleston, WV), Paul J. Nyden wrote that King has sued John Fitzpatrick and John Jessee, two of the lawyers who have represented Putnam General and HCA in the litigation, and their firm, LeClair Ryan.  Jessee still practices at the firm, but Fitzpatrick left earlier this year and joined Wheeler Trigg Kennedy LLP in Denver.  The suit was filed in United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida.  King v. LeClair Ryan, et al., Civil Action No. 5:07-CV-00112-RS-AK.

    In King's complaint, which is accompanied by 17 exhibits, he basically alleges that the  defendants' defense of the hospital has adversely affected his ability to practice medicine and has been responsible for the adverse publicity he has received.  The exhibits include copies of newspaper articles, correspondence, and pleadings from the underlying malpractice litigation.    (Although King has legally changed his name from "John Anderson King" to "Christopher Wallace Martin," he identifies himself in the complaint as "John Christopher King.")

    Counsel for John Jessee today filed a motion to dismiss and supporting memorandum on the grounds that Jessee has not committed any acts that would subject him to the court's jurisdiction, nor does Jessee have sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to support an action against him there.   There have been no responsive pleadings filed by or on behalf of LeClair Ryan or Fitzpatrick. 

    This is not the first lawsuit that King has brought against lawyers who have represented Putnam General Hospital.  King has been a plaintiff in several lawsuits in federal court for the Southern District of West Virginia.  He has sued, in various actions, a wide range of defendants, including multiple lawyers and law firms, Putnam General Hospital, its officers and directors,  the American Osteopathic  Association, the American  Medical Association, and the Daily Gazette Company (which publishes the Charleston Gazette and the Daily Mail).   All of the cases have been dismissed on the defendants' motions, which is the same fate that will befall King's lawsuit in Florida federal court.

Class Action Trial Against DuPont Begins

    Trial started this week in a class action against DuPont and other defendants in the Circuit Court of Harrison County (Clarksburg), West Virginia.  Perrine, et al. v. E. I. du Pont  de Nemours, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 04-C-296-2.  There are approximately 7,000 class members, who seek damages for medical monitoring, property damage, and punitive damages.  Here is the class action website.

    The plaintiffs allege that a zinc smelting plan located at Spelter, West Virginia contaminated their property and released hazardous substances, including arsenic, cadmium, and lead, into the atmosphere.  The Circuit Court certified a class on September 14, 2006.  Its order describes the geographic area involved in the litigation. 

ERISA Pre-emption, Continued

    A few days ago, I wrote about a recent United States District Court decision awarding benefits to the widow of a man who had accidentally overdosed on prescription medications.  I noted that based on ERISA pre-emption, almost all such cases have to be brought in federal court, where the claims and damages available to plaintiffs are very limited.

    Today, in the Boston ERISA Law Blog, Stephen Rosenberg pokes a little fun at The Wall Street Journal Law Blog’s fascination this week with the doctrine of pre-emption, and accurately describes ERISA pre-emption (which the WSJ Law Blog has omitted from its discussion) as “the most important and interesting application of preemption ….”

    Rosenberg also points out that efforts by states to require employers to provide health care coverage to their employees demonstrate that ERISA pre-emption “is in fact the one area of preemption that consistently affects broad numbers of everyday, real life people ….”   He is referring to Maryland’s Fair Share Act, which was held by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Retail Industry Leaders' Association v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007),  to be pre-empted by ERISA, and to efforts by California to provide universal health coverage.  Rosenberg's post from August 27, entitled "California, Health Insurance and ERISA Preemption," includes a link to a paper on the topic by University of Maryland Professor Sharon Reece and a post by the Workplace Prof Blog.

    Rosenberg seems to doubt the success of such efforts (and he appears to be right, according to The Wall Street Journal article referenced above), but Brian King at the ERISA Law Blog has a contrary view, in this post from April 27

    My own view is that unless Congress amends ERISA’s pre-emption language (highly unlikely, at least in the short term) or the United States Supreme Court holds that ERISA’s scope of pre-emption is too broad (even more unlikely, given the enormous body of federal law, including, significantly, decisions from the Supreme Court, which has repeatedly endorsed that scope as demonstrating Congressional intent), legislation like California’s will be pre-empted. 

WV Supreme Court Starts Its Fall Term

    I intended to post this yesterday, but ran out of time.  In any event, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia started its Fall Term yesterday, which runs through November 21.  The Court has posted several of its motion and argument dockets on its calendar, which also includes the Court's writ, decision, opinion, and administrative conferences.

    For cases on the argument docket, which are appeals or petitions that the Court has accepted, the Clerk's office posts the parties' briefs in PDF format.  For cases on the motion docket, which have not yet been accepted or refused by the Court, the parties' pleadings are not available online.  Although the size of the Court's dockets precludes an extensive discussion of all or even most of the cases,  I will attempt to identify cases, particularly on the argument docket, that present important issues.

    Today, the Court will hear argument in State ex rel. Chemtall Inc., et al. v. The Honorable John T. Madden, et al., No 33380, which involves claims for medical monitoring by a proposed class of former coal preparation plan workers who were exposed to polyacrylamide flocculants, which are products used to treat coal wash water at preparation plants.  The petitioners, who are the defendants, are seeking a writ of prohibition and/or mandamus against the Circuit Court of Marshall County to prevent enforcement of two orders that the petitioners claim are contrary to the Supreme Court's prior opinions in this case.

    The Supreme Court has issued decision regarding the Chemtall case on two earlier occasions.  In the first decision, State of West Virginia ex rel. Chemtall Inc. v. Madden, 607 S.E.2d 772 (W.Va. 2004), the Court vacated the Circuit Court's certification of a class that included plaintiffs from seven states, some of which did not recognize medical monitoring, and directed the Circuit Court to consider whether such differences in the law would preclude the adjudication of the claims  arising from several states on a class-wide basis.  The second decision, Stern v. Chemtall Inc., 617 S.E.2d 876 (W.Va. 2005), reversed a denial of intervention sought by two coal preparation plant workers, who had been plaintiffs in an earlier suit, and a water treatment worker.    

    The petitioners challenge the Circuit Court's decisions to allow the water treatment worker to participate in the action, to permit the use a punitive damages multiplier in a medical monitoring action, and to allow the common adjudication of claims that arise under West Virginia and Pennsylvania's medical monitoring laws. 

    I had written about West Virginia's medical monitoring law in an earlier post dealing with Mattel's recall of defective toys.  I think the most significant issues presented in this case are whether the the punitive damages multiplier is permissible and whether the trial court can adjudicate claims that arise under both West Virginia and Pennsylvania medical monitoring laws.  As I read the parties' pleadings, the law in West Virginia is unsettled on both of those issues, and each has potentially tremendous consequences.

Nursing Home Operator Sues Law Firm for Trademark Infringement

    When a law firm uses a company’s trademark and logo in its advertisements, has the law firm infringed or misappropriated the company’s intellectual property?   That is the issue, among others, raised in a lawsuit filed by Genesis HealthCare, which operates skilled nursing centers and assisted living facilities in several states, including West Virginia, against McHugh Fuller Law Group, a law firm with offices in Hattiesburg, Mississippi and Charleston, West Virginia.  The case was filed in the Southern District of West Virginia on August 3, 2007, and has been assigned to the Honorable Joseph R. Goodwin.  Genesis HealthCare Corporation v. McHugh Fuller Law Group, Civil Action No. 2:07-CV-00481.

    The basis for Genesis' claims is that McHugh Fuller operates a website entitled www.genesisconcerns.com, which discusses nursing home abuse cases and points out that several Genesis facilities have a history of substandard care, as shown by various state inspections.  The site also describes various injuries sustained by nursing home abuse victims.

    Genesis moved for a preliminary injunction against McHugh Fuller in order to have the website taken down, but failed to include a verified complaint with its motion, which caused the Court to deny Genesis' request for an injunction.  Genesis then refiled its motion for a preliminary injunction with a verified complaint

    Genesis' more recent filings allege violations of the Federal Trademark Act ("the Lanham Act") and the federal Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, and a state law claim for statutory dilution.   McHugh Fuller has responded in opposition to the motion and has answered the complaint.  The Court has not rescheduled a hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction.

    I would like to hear from others with experience in intellectual property litigation as to whether Genesis is likely to prevail in its claims against McHugh Fuller. 

Bush Nominates Two for Fourth Circuit Seats

    This is a follow-up to my post last month about the vacancies on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, as reported by The Washington Post.  On Friday, The Wall Street Journal Law Blog posted about two nominations made by President Bush to fill the vacancies. 
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Wrongful Termination Lawsuit Reveals Wal-Mart's Surveillance Practices

    You may not recognize Julie Roehm’s name, but chances are you know about her employment and termination by Wal-Mart, and the litigation that has revealed Wal-Mart’s aggressive surveillance practices.

    In January 2006, Wal-Mart hired Roehm, a highly-regarded advertising executive, from Daimler Chryler Corporation, as its senior vice-president of marketing communications. By all accounts, she was shaking things up at a company that understood that it needed to move past its 1950s model of marketing. 

    But in December, Wal-Mart fired Roehm and her protégé, Sean Womack, and terminated its relationship with DraftFCB, an advertising agency she had hired.  Wal-Mart alleged that Roehm and Womack had an impermissible personal relationship, and that DraftFCB had provided gifts to Roehm, in violation of Wal-Mart’s stringent gratuity policy. Here is The Wall Street Journal’s article from December 11, 2006, which provided some background. According to the article, Roehm did not have an employment contract or any severance agreement with Wal-Mart.

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Court Awards Accidental Death Benefits for Fatal Overdose of Prescription Medications

    Long-term disability cases generate an enormous amount of litigation, almost always in federal court because of the scope of ERISA pre-emption.  ERISA also bars state law claims, such as negligence and breach of contract, and compensatory and punitive damages.  Thus, a claimant is typically limited to the amount of the benefits at issue in his or her claim and possibly an award of attorney’s fees.

    Further, if the plan grants discretion to the administrator to make eligibility decisions, as many, if not most, plans do, the court is obligated to defer to the administrator’s decision, which means that unless the court finds that the administrator abused its discretion (the “arbitrary and capricious” standard), the court must affirm the decision, even if the court would have decided the issue differently.

    But out of federal court for the Northern District of West Virginia comes a decision, admittedly with an atypical set of facts, which demonstrates that a plaintiff can prevail in an LTD claim.  In Gower v. AIG Claim Services, Inc., 2007 WL 2119262 (N.D.W.Va.), Kathy Gower filed a claim for accidental death benefits resulting from the death of her husband, a 41 year old coal miner.  AIG provided a group accident insurance policy through Peabody Holding Company, the parent of Gower’s husband’s employer, Eastern Associated Coal Corporation. 

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Defense Firms Respond to Increased Competition, Move into Contingency Fee Work

    A few months ago, I wrote about the changing economics that were encouraging, if not forcing, defense firms to take contingency cases that were traditionally the work of plaintiffs' firms.  In this month's issue of Litigation Update, which is published by the American Bar Association's Section of Litigation, Stewart Weltman has written an article entitled Contingency Litigation 101 -- for Big Firms, which identifies several strategies for firms that are considering a move into contingency fee litigation.
 
    As Mr. Weltman points out, "to be more competitive and obtain prime litigation matters, firms that never considered contingency are more receptive to some form of it as part of their compensation for both plaintiff and defense matters."  The significance of this development is that not only are defense firms competing against plaintiffs' firms for work, but they are having to adapt their own compensation structure from hourly fees to contingency work.  The competition works both ways: defense firms can represent plaintiffs, but corporations are frequently turning to plaintiffs' firms for representation in defense matters, because of the client's concern about cost or because the plaintiffs' firm may be more flexible in what it can charge and how and when it gets paid.

WV Supreme Court Rejects Learned Intermediary Doctrine

    John Day of Day On Torts wrote a post last week about the Supreme Court of West Virginia's recent decision in State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647  S.E.2d  899 (W.Va. 2007), in which the Court declined to adopt the learned intermediary doctrine "as an exception to the general duty of manufacturers to warn consumers of the dangerous propensities of their products."

    The learned intermediary doctrine provides that "a drug manufacturer is excused from warning each patient who receives the prescription drug when the manufacturer properly warns the prescribing physician of the product's dangers."

    The Court reviewed the law in every other state and found that the doctrine had been adopted by decision of the state's highest court or by statute in 22 states, while an equal number had not adopted it.  Six other states had referred to the doctrine favorably in dicta or had adopted it in a context unrelated to prescription drugs, but had not adopted it with respect to prescription drugs.

    The majority opinion found that, "Significant changes in the drug industry have post-dated the adoption of the learned intermediary doctrine in the majority of states in which it is followed.  We refer specifically to the initiation and intense proliferation of direct-to-consumer advertising, along with its impact on the physician/patient relationship, and the development of the internet as a common method of dispensing and obtaining prescription drug information."

    The Court found that West Virginia's existing law of comparative contribution among joint tortfeasors is adequate to address issues of liability in cases where patients sued their physicians and the drug companies regarding the use of prescription drugs.  The Court also noted that drug manufacturers had the means and the ability to communicate directly and effectively with consumers, and that it was reasonable to place the burden of providing appropriate warnings on the drug manufacturers because they benefited financially from the sales of their products and possessed the knowledge regarding potential harms posed by their products. 

    Finally, I need to note one correction to John's post.  He wrote that with the Johnson & Johnson opinion, the learned intermediary doctrine was no longer the law in West Virginia.  But the point of the decision was to decline to adopt the doctrine in West Virginia's jurisprudence.